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COMMENT ON THE HARRIS PAPER
Dale Oesterle t
One cannot dispute, first, that government overreaction to any
event is socially harmful, and, second, that many of the proposals
for government regulation made in response to the dramatic Octo-
ber 1987 market reversal fall into this category. As several of to-
day's papers have argued, restricting index arbitrage harms the
price functioning of our markets, restricting portfolio insurance is
unnecessary-as market players now recognize that its performance
was overvalued, increasing margin requirements on futures does
not reduce market volatility. As for trading halts-and here my po-
sition is a bit different than those that have been proposed today-
they are not helpful unless we better figure out how to get markets
opened more efficiently.
Bloody Monday reminded us of what we already know: our mar-
kets are at their most inefficient at their openings. On October 19th
and 20th, the rotation opening system for options' and specialist
price setting in the stock exchanges 2 were sources of major pricing
breakdowns. We would have done better on the 20th had we run
the markets through the previous night rather than close them. Au-
tomatic trading halts, based either on volume or price, make open-
ings more problematic, since the market must be restarted after
each halt.
The October crash revealed some mechanical weaknesses in the
microstructure of our capital markets. For each weakness, at issue is
not only how it should be corrected, but also who ought we rely
upon, to correct it: individual traders, professional associations of
traders, SEC, or Congress. Some of the answers already have been
provided: the NASD has moved swiftly to correct several problems
in the OTC automated quotation and small order execution sys-
tems,3 and the NYSE has moved to increase the capacity of its com-
puterized offer and trade reporting systems. Other mechanical
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1971; M.P.P. 1974; J.D. 1975, Uni-
versity of Michigan.
I See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS VI-69 to
VI-70 [hereinafter BRADY REPORT]; DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 8-5 to 8-7 (1988) [here-
inafter SEC REPORT].
2 BRADY REPORT, supra note 1, at VI-45 to VI-46; SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-8
to 4-9.
3 See SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-24 to 9-25.
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deficiencies will bc more difficult to correct, primarily because they
involve cross-market arrangements. I want to address briefly the
most poignant of these-the liquidity problems created by the dif-
ferent cash flow systems in our various financial markets.
Futures and options markets are settled on a same-day or next
day basis, while stocks settle in five business days (with the initial
margin payment collected by the seventh day). Settlement pay-
ments refer to the final payment of funds between the clearing
house for trade registered to a specific point in time. Normally this
means paying for stocks and long options, or providing variation
margin deposits for futures and short options. 4 As a consequence,
intermarket hedged positions consisting of stocks or options com-
bined with futures will require continuous financing, as cash de-
mands in one market are not matched with cash payments in
another. If banks get nervous about the solvency of the central
clearing houses in any one of the markets (on October 19 an options
clearing house was rumored to be in trouble), this financing can dry
up unexpectedly. 5 Once it does, an investor can be sold out to meet
margin requirements in one market although he is solvent in a sec-
ond. At present, our solution is to rely on last minute reprieves
from margin requirements by individual clearing corporations6 and
calls from the Chairman of the Federal Reserve to our banks in
which he provides assurances that stimulate bank lending to our
market makers. 7
Several proposals are circulating that aim to head off a similar
liquidity crisis in the future. The best of these, and the hardest to
implement, aim at changing the different cash flow systems in the
various markets so that they all work on the same basis cycles. The
President's Working Group, for example, suggest "future-style mar-
gining for options." Conceivably, individual stocks as well as op-
tions on stocks could be marked-to-market and settled daily in cash
like futures.8 Or, in the other direction, we could accrue gains and
losses on futures for five days rather than paying out and collecting
cash on a daily basis.
Neither alternative seems feasible. Although it is possible for
4 Variation margin refers to settlement payments, other than the final settlement
payment that a clearing house may call to reduce the magnitude of the final settlement
payment.
5 Banks are particularly skitterish in chaotic times because at present it is very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to perfect a security interest on an intermarket position. For a
description of the role of the banks on October 20, 1987, see T. MET-Z, BLACK MONDAY:
THE CATASTROPHE OF OCTOBER 19, 1987 AND BEYOND 176-77 (1988).
6 SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-47, 10-48.
7 Wall St.J., Nov. 20, 1987, at 1, 7.
8 In the early 1900's, stock was settled on a same-day basis.
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"street side" transactions-contracts among brokers and dealers-
to settle on a same or next day basis, it is not possible for "customer
side" transactions-broker and dealer settlements with customers-
to do this.9 Disconnecting street side and customer side settlement
limits would merely shift the liquidity crunch to those handling cus-
tomer accounts, not solve it. On the other hand, eliminating daily
settlement of futures would make those instruments significantly
more risky and less attractive investment vehicles.
If coordinating the settlement cycles of options, futures, and
stocks is impractical-as it appears to be-a second best solution
may be to implement intermarket cross-margining. In intermarket
cross-margining, participants in one market that have offsetting po-
sitions in another market are allowed to receive credit in meeting
their margin requirements. On October 19, the separate clearing
houses for stock, options, and futures markets did not recognize the
value of positions held by the others. As a consequence, several in-
vestors found themselves unable to meet margin calls in futures
even though they were racking up profits in put options.10 The fu-
tures clearing house would not consider the option profits in its cal-
culation of the investor's margins on the futures.
Cross-margining allows institutional traders and market makers
to post lower margins for intermargin positions that are commensu-
rate with their lower risk of default." This would increase in-
termarket arbitrage trading and reduce the spreads that currently
exist between the markets. In short, cross-margining does not solve
the problem of the markets' disjointed cash flow cycles, but it may
lessen the liquidity problems they create. The Brady Commission
Report, the SEC Report, and the President's Working Group en-
dorsed cross-margining. 12
Moreover, any cross-margining system will have substantial side
benefits. A successful cross-margining system necessitates a contin-
uous sharing of information among the various markets on the posi-
tions of single traders. Banks would be more willing to lend funds
9 See SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-26. Customer side settlement recently has
been automated with the National Institutional Delivery System (NIDS). Widespread
use of the system is very recent, and 25% of all confirmed trades still fail to settle in five
days or are settled outside securities depositories. Id.
10 Wall St.J., Nov. 11, 1988, at C1, col. 3.
11 For a critique of cross-margining see Rutz, The Myth & Reality of Intermarket Cross-
Margining, Intermarket at 18 (Aug. 1988). Mr. Rutz is president and chief executive
officer of the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation in Chicago. He worried about the
effect of cross-margining on reducing the cash position of the various market clearing
houses. The answer to his concerns seems to be in a revision of net capital requirements
for clearing house members, in penalizing solvent trades.
12 BRADY REPORT, supra note 1, at 65-66; SEC REPORT, supranote 1, at xxv, 10-56 to
10-58.
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on intermarket positions because they can more confidently perfect
security interests on intermarket positions. Individual exchanges
would be able to more quickly assess and interdict the strategic be-
havior of unfortunate traders who, because they find themselves
deeply in debt on obligations in one exchange, attempt to take ex-
tremely risky positions in other markets in order to "make it all
back."
In any event, vested interests in the health of individual markets
may make these cross-market changes unlikely if the markets are left
to negotiate them on their own. Some promising steps have been
taken. The Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange have established a new vehicle for cross-margining
options and futures-the new CBOE 250 index futures contract.' 3
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Options Clearing Corpo-
ration have agreed to develop a cross-margin system for stock index
futures and stock index options,1 4 but so far the Chicago Board of
Trade has refused to join in. The major clearing corporation for
our stock exchanges, the National Securities Clearing Corporation,
is not yet included in any cross-margining understanding. While
these are positive beginnings, some form of heavy-handed govern-
ment intervention may be necessary to, at minimum, mediate more
comprehensive cross-market arrangements and, perhaps, to impose
arrangements on otherwise deadlocked parties.' 5
Congress, in 1975, added section 17(a) to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, and required the SEC "to use its authority to
facilitate the establishment of a national system for the prompt and
accurate clearance and settlement of transactions in securities."
The SEC has not carried out this mandate and ought to do so, par-
ticularly to alleviate intermarket cash flow discrepancies. I am not
urging that we develop a single clearing house for all the markets, as
some have. Such a system would eliminate healthy competition
among clearing houses that would encourage innovation. More-
13 Wall St.J., Nov. 11, 1988, at CI, col. 3. Though the new contract is a Chicago
Board of Trade futures contract, it is traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange,
which also trades the most popular stock index option on the S&P 100. This allows the
two exchanges to cooperate on margin requirements. Profits on the stock index option
are used in computing maintenance margins on the futures and vice versa. Moreover,
initial margin requirements are lower for fully hedged positions. The Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange, which trades options on the S&P 500, may soon follow, having signed a
letter of intent with the Options Clearing House to develop a system of cross-margining.
Id.
14 "Clearing Houses Plan Cross-Margining System,"J. COMMERCE at 20A (Sept. 28,
1988).
15 See Cohen, Comments &Zecher, in AFTER THE CRASH 15,49 (1988) Joel Cohen was
general counsel for the Brady Commission; Richard Zecher is a Senior Vice President of
the Chase Manhattan Bank).
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over, a single clearing house could consolidate enormous risk in one
entity, too much for private ownership perhaps. On the other hand,
the SEC could facilitate (mandate?) linkages among the existing sep-
arate clearing houses that enable effective cross-margining among
members of more than one house. 16
16 See Brodsky, Comments in AFTER THE CRASH 57 (1988) (William Brodsky is the
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange) (noting
"technical and political" problems standing in the way of cross margining).
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